Because both Mohammed and al-Libbi had minimized al-Kuwaiti's importance, officials speculated that he was part of bin Laden's inner circle.Pakistani officials in 2011 stated the courier's name was Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed, from Pakistan's Swat Valley.
"The SEALs started to cheer." The CIA briefed Vice Admiral William H.Mc Raven, the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), about the compound in January 2011. Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU) to work with a CIA team at their campus in Langley, Virginia.The compound had no Internet or landline telephone service. The CIA team used informants and other techniques – including a widely criticized fake polio vaccination program drone before, during and after the raid on the compound.Its residents burned their refuse, unlike their neighbors, who set their garbage out for collection. The NGA created three-dimensional renderings of the house, created schedules describing residential traffic patterns, and assessed the number, height and gender of the residents of the compound.Neptune's spear is the trident, which appears on the U. Navy's Special Warfare insignia, with the three prongs of the trident representing the operational capacity of SEALs on sea, air and land. But, they had full authority to kill him." Another source referencing a kill (rather than capture) order stated, "Officials described the reaction of the special operators when they were told a number of weeks ago that they had been chosen to train for the mission.
'They were told, "We think we found Osama bin Laden, and your job is to kill him,"' an official recalled.
The operation, code-named Operation Neptune Spear, was carried out in a CIA-led operation with Joint Special Operations Command, commonly known as JSOC, coordinating the Special Mission Units involved in the raid. forces took bin Laden's body to Afghanistan for identification, then buried him at sea within 24 hours of his death in accordance with Islamic tradition. According to the earlier official version of his identification from a U. official, identification of al-Qaeda couriers was an early priority for interrogators at CIA black sites and the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, because bin Laden was believed to communicate through such couriers while concealing his whereabouts from al-Qaeda foot soldiers and top commanders. One of those claims came from Mohammed al-Qahtani, a detainee interrogated for 48 days more or less continuously between November 23, 2002, and January 11, 2003.
In addition to SEAL Team Six, participating units under JSOC included the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)—also known as "Night Stalkers"—and operators from the CIA's Special Activities Division, which recruits heavily from former JSOC Special Mission Units. At some point during this period, al-Qahtani told interrogators about a man known as Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti who was part of the inner circle of al-Qaeda. Ghul stated that al-Kuwaiti was close to bin Laden as well as Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed's successor Abu Faraj al-Libbi.
The design of bin Laden's compound may have ultimately contributed to his discovery.
A former CIA official involved in the manhunt told The Washington Post: "The place was three stories high, and you could watch it from a variety of angles." The CIA used a process called "red teaming" on the collected intelligence to independently review the circumstantial evidence and available facts of their case that bin Laden was living at the Abbottabad compound.
The CIA led the effort to surveil and gather intelligence on the compound; other critical roles in the operation were played by other United States agencies, including the National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and U. which, among other things, is specialized in surreptitiously installing spyware and tracking devices on targeted computers and mobile-phone networks.